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I. Introduction
It is nowwidely recognized that political institutions have had amajor inﬂuence
on the nature and scope of economic development in broad historical terms
ðNunn 2009Þ. Across the developing world there has been a large amount of
attention given to the inﬂuence of colonial institutions in recent years, with a
smaller but growing ﬁeld of study demonstrating the impact of the precolonial
period on postcolonial developments ðHjort 2010; Green 2012; Jha 2013Þ. In
one recent example of this trend, several scholars have suggested that preco-
lonial political centralization has had an impact on contemporary levels of de-
velopment within Africa ðGennaioli and Rainer 2007; Michalopoulos and Pa-
paioannou 2013; Fenske 2014; Alsan 2015; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
2015Þ.Measuringprecolonial centralizationbyusingdata fromMurdock ð1967Þ,
they show a robust positive correlation between the percentage of each coun-
try’s population that is from a centralized ethnic group and outcomes such as
light density at night, paved roads, immunization, literacy, and infant mortality
rates.
Much of this work, however, has been based on outdated ethnographic data
that fail to capture postcolonial patterns of migration and urbanization that
may have affected contemporary developmental outcomes. Moreover, there re-
main questions as to the actual mechanism through which precolonial central-
ization has affected contemporary developmental outcomes. Thus, for instance,
if centralization appears to have a positive effect on the provision of locally
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provided public goods today, then the mechanism would appear to be via local
institutions; if, however, centralization is correlated with private goods but not
public goods, then the mechanism would appear to be via the accumulation of
wealth in centralized areas in the past and the persistence in wealth across time.
We therefore test the centralization hypothesis at the subnational level in a
single country for the ﬁrst time. We use the example of Uganda, a map of
which can be found in ﬁgure 1, for several reasons. First, Uganda demonstrates
Figure 1. Map of Uganda. Color version available as an online enhancement
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large variance in centralization across different parts of the country.1 Second,
because of decentralization policies that began after the current government
took ofﬁce in 1986, local governments have played a large role in local public
goods provision, thereby allowing us to test the mechanism that centralization
has affected development outcomes through local government institutions.
Third, because of the availability of development data at the district and sub-
county level, we are able to use large sample sizes, with 56–76 observations at
the district level and 958 at the subcounty level. Fourth, because of the fact
that Uganda is one of 20 countries in Africa to have been surveyed by the
Afrobarometer, we can also employ survey data that contain information on
assets, public goods, ethnicity, and a variety of control variables. Fifth, unlike
most African censuses that fail to record any data on ethnicity, the most recent
Ugandan census from 2002 contains data on ethnicity disaggregated down to the
level of the subcounty, thereby allowing us to construct a detailed picture of pre-
colonial centralization.2 Finally, the use of a single country case study allows us
to identify an instrument for precolonial centralization that can thereby help
to clarify the direction of causality.
Our results are striking in two ways. First, using a variety of dependent
variables, we conﬁrm the hypothesis that precolonial centralization is highly
correlated with modern-day development outcomes at the district, subcounty,
and individual levels. These results are robust to the use of various control
variables and clustered standard errors; we also use distance from the ancient
capital of Mubende as an instrument for precolonial political centralization
and ﬁnd that most of our results become even stronger. However, our second
ﬁnding is that a number of dependent variables are not correlated with pre-
colonial centralization, speciﬁcally those that measure public goods provision
like immunization and schooling as well as access to hospitals, clean water, and
other public services. Moreover, using Afrobarometer results we ﬁnd that there
is no relationship between local levels of precolonial centralization and the
quality of public services. These ﬁndings are thus consistent with a correlation
between precolonial centralization and the accumulation of private goods rather
than public goods, thereby suggesting the persistence of poverty andwealth from
the precolonial period to the present.
The article is organized as follows. First, we give an overview of the liter-
ature in Section II before describing our data in Section III, including how we
1 Indeed, for this reason Gennaioli and Rainer ð2007, 188–91Þ use it as their primary qualitative
example for the impact of precolonial centralization on postcolonial outcomes.
2 Morning ð2008Þ ﬁnds that only 44% of African countries ask questions about ethnicity on their
censuses, tied with Europe for the lowest proportion among all regions in the world. Some countries
like Tanzania have not asked questions about ethnicity on their censuses since the 1960s.
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ascribed different levels of precolonial complexity to each of Uganda’s 56
ethnic groups. In Section IV we present our empirical analysis, using data at
the district, subcounty, and individual levels, as well as the use of an instru-
mental variable in Section V. In Section VI we show how our results differ ac-
cording to private versus public goods. In Section VII we conclude.
II. Related Literature
There is a growing emphasis within development economics on the role of
history in determining contemporary development outcomes. Much of this re-
cent work owes to the seminal inﬂuence of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
ð2001Þ, who argue that the quality of colonial institutions is an important de-
terminant of economic development across the postcolonial world. While much
of this work has examined the legacies of colonialism, a small but growing lit-
erature has discussed the role of the precolonial period in determining modern-
day outcomes. For instance, Green ð2012Þ shows that low precolonial popula-
tion densities in Africa led colonizers to construct large states with artiﬁcial
straight-line borders that have persisted to the present day, whileHuillery ð2011Þ
claims that the congruence between precolonial and postcolonial wealth pat-
terns in French West Africa is due to European tendencies to settle in rich yet
peaceful areas. In southern Africa, Hjort ð2010Þ argues that Botswana’s post-
colonial success derives from precolonial cultural characteristics that favored
good interethnic relations, democratic institutions, and individual property
rights. Finally, in India Jha ð2013Þ exhibits a positive correlation between pre-
colonial trade patterns and contemporary peaceful Muslim-Hindu relations.
In one recent article, Gennaioli and Rainer ð2007Þ argue that precolonial
centralization is a determinant of postcolonial African development. They
measure precolonial centralization by using data fromMurdock ð1967Þ, which
lists information about ethnic groups from around the world along a variety of
dimensions. One of these dimensions is political centralization, which ranges
from 0 for acephalous or stateless societies such as the Kikuyu ðKenyaÞ and
Nuer ðSudanÞ to 4 for highly centralized groups like the Javanese and Viet-
namese. More centralized ethnic groups thus have more integrated and hier-
archical governments, while less centralized groups have more fragmented
political leadership. Using these data as well as demographic data from the
1960s, Gennaioli and Rainer ð2007Þ calculate the percentage of each African
country’s population that is a member of an ethnic group with a precolonial
centralization score of 2 or higher. They then regress contemporarymeasures of
paved roads, immunization, literacy, and infant mortality rates on their politi-
cal centralization variable and ﬁnd robust statistically signiﬁcant relationships
between centralization and all ﬁve public goods. They claim that the mecha-
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nism linking precolonial centralization to modern-day development outcomes
is the legitimacy of local government institutions, such that more centralized
groups have been able to introduce modern technologies and coordinate gov-
ernment activities better than noncentralized groups.
Gennaioli and Rainer’s ð2007Þ argument is intriguing but cannot be con-
sidered deﬁnitive, in part because of the low number of observations in their
sample as well as an inability to rule out potential reverse causality. More re-
cently, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou ð2013Þ have used satellite images to
examine the impact of precolonial centralization on regional nighttime light
density. In their analysis the basic unit of observation for precolonial central-
ization is the ethnic group, while their observational unit for light density is
the ethnic group homeland. As with Gennaioli and Rainer ð2007Þ, they show
a robust positive impact of precolonial centralization on contemporary out-
comes, both at the ethnic group level and at the sub-ethnic-group level of the
pixel from their luminosity data.
Despite their use of much more ﬁne-grained data than Gennaioli and
Rainer ð2007Þ, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou ð2013Þ nonetheless suffer
from two notable concerns. First, by using the level of precolonial centraliza-
tion for the entire ethnic homeland, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou ð2013Þ
assume that the level of political centralization was a constant across each ethnic
homeland, an implausible assumption given the rich literature on how even the
most centralized precolonial African states saw their power trail off as one got
closer to their borders ðsee Herbst ½2000 for a general overviewÞ. For instance,
the core of nineteenth-century Burundi was controlled by the mwami ðkingÞ,
while outlying regions were instead ruled over by various princes and chiefs
ðLemarchand 1994, 37Þ; in Rwanda as well the state controlled the core, but the
peripheral populations near its borders lived more autonomously and “were
perceived pejoratively as not very ‘Rwandan’” ðChrétien 2003, 161Þ. Indeed, the
historical literature suggests a strong link between declining political inﬂuence as
one traveled outward from the state core and a declining tendency to identify
ethnically with the state’s core ethnic group ðChrétien 2003; Green 2008Þ.
Second, it is not exactly clear whether luminosity is an indicator of the accu-
mulation of privatewealth or the provision of public goods, with previous studies
showing clear correlations with the former but not investigating any links with
the latter ðHenderson, Storeygard, andWeil 2008; Chen andNordhaus 2011Þ.3
3 Michalopoulos and Papaioannou ð2013Þ do show a series of positive correlations between luminos-
ity and access to public goods across four African countries, but here again the direction of causality is
difﬁcult to interpret.
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III. Empirical Overview
Here we examine the role of precolonial centralization at the subnational level
in Uganda. As noted above, Uganda exhibits large internal variation in the
distribution of political centralization, with the traditional centralized king-
doms of Ankole, Buganda, Bunyoro, Busoga, and Toro in the south and west
and the noncentralized areas of the Acholi, Itesot, Karamojong, and Langi in
the north and east. Upon colonizing Uganda in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the British maintained local ethnic identities through their
policy of indirect rule; while the British did use Baganda intermediaries to help
conquer other parts of the country, they were quickly replaced such that by the
1910s almost all areas of the country were ruled over by local chiefs ðRoberts
1962Þ. However, the role of these chiefs was altered signiﬁcantly under colonial
rule, inasmuch as they became less accountable to their subjects and more
accountable to the British, thereby turning them into “decentralized despots”
ðMamdani 1996Þ. This shift in accountability was most obvious in non-
centralized areas, where the British introduced chiefdoms as a means to govern
local areas, but it was also true in centralized areas where ethnic kings sup-
posedly had power over local government but were still overseen by the British
administration. Indeed, to take one example, chiefs in Buganda had become so
unpopular because of their dictatorial tendencies that riots erupted against their
rule in 1945 and 1949, leading the British government to force through the
election of chiefs in Buganda before the country gained independence in 1962.
The differences in local government between centralized and noncentralized
areas were abolished in the 1967 constitution, which also abolished all king-
doms in southern Uganda. These kingdoms were eventually restored in the
1990s, but only as cultural organizations with no ofﬁcial role for chiefs, such
that local government structures continue to remain the same across the whole
country.4 In other words, the legal/institutional differences between the king-
dom and nonkingdom areas were present in the past but have not existed for
almost 50 years.
With few exceptions, neither the colonial nor postcolonial governments
encouraged ethnic change or assimilation such that we can be reasonably con-
ﬁdent about the continuity of ethnic identity from the precolonial era to the
present.5 We cannot, however, be so conﬁdent that areas that were within the
4 Chiefs in the kingdom areas do exist but receive no state salaries and have no power over land or
any other local resources, which are instead in the hands of local government ofﬁcials.
5 Under President Idi Amin in the 1970s there was some evidence of people switching ethnic
identities to access state power, but this process came to an end when his regime fell in 1979 ðKasﬁr
1979Þ. More importantly, during the colonial period the Buganda region saw some Banyoro and
Banyarwanda migrants assimilate into Buganda society in order to access land in the region ðGreen
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ethnic homelands of centralized groups in the precolonial era would be home
only to members of centralized groups today. As elsewhere in colonial Africa,
the British colonial administration set up cotton, coffee, and sugar industries
in central and southern Uganda in the early twentieth century to which they
recruited migrant labor from northern and eastern Uganda as well as from
Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo through the introduction of the poll tax and
other measures ðMamdani 1976, 52, 149–51Þ. Many of these migration pat-
terns continued after independence, not only for economic reasons but also
because of political instability and civil war in northern and eastern Uganda
and surrounding neighboring states. While some of these migrants were only
temporary, many others settled permanently such that members of non-
centralized groups account today for signiﬁcant percentages of the population
within the ethnic homelands of centralized groups. For instance, Masindi dis-
trict is located in the kingdom of Bunyoro and its capital, Masindi town, was
brieﬂy capital of the kingdom between 1912 and 1924. However, because of
decades of migration only 39.9% of the population of Masindi district in
Bunyoro region identiﬁed as members of centralized groups on the 2002 census,
while those from noncentralized groups included Alur ð20.4% of the pop-
ulationÞ, Acholi ð9.2%Þ, and Lugbara ð6.9%Þ. Similarly low percentages of cen-
tralized groups inhabit Bugiri district in Busoga kingdom ð34.3%Þ and Kam-
wenge district in Toro kingdom ð52.3%Þ, among others. In other words, coding
each area as centralized according to its precolonial status would fail to account
for colonial and postcolonial demographic changes and thus yield imprecise
estimates.6
As such, we use local districts and subcounties as our units of observations
and use 2002 census data to measure the percentage of the population within
each unit that is from a centralized ethnic group. We use the same method-
ology for computing precolonial centralization in Uganda as Gennaioli and
Rainer ð2007Þ and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou ð2013Þ, albeit at the dis-
6 This issue, which arises in Michalopoulos and Papaioannou ð2013Þ, would not be a problem if the
mechanism by which precolonial centralization inﬂuences contemporary development is transferred
across time via territory regardless of who now lives in the relevant geographical unit. However, if
instead it is transferred intergenerationally within members of centralized ethnic groups, then Mi-
chalopoulos and Papaioannou’s ð2013Þ analysis cannot distinguish between areas that were inhabited
by centralized groups in the precolonial period but today have different demographic proﬁles due to
migration. In any case, we reran our results from tables 1, 4, and 5 below using an ordinal measure of
centralization along the lines used by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou ð2013Þ, with a noticeable loss
of precision but otherwise very similar results ðavailable from authors on requestÞ.
2008Þ. As a result, we reran all of our estimations excluding the Buganda region, with no changes in
our results ðavailable from authorsÞ.
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trict and subcounty level; as elsewhere in Africa, we observe several stateless
societies at level 0 in our Ugandan sample but no highly complex groups at
level 4. The district is the highest level of local government; in recent years the
national government has repeatedly created new districts, such that in our
analysis below the number of districts varies between 56 and 80 depending on
the date the data were collected.7 The subcounty is the third-highest level of
local government ðout of ﬁve different levelsÞ; in contrast to the ever-increasing
number of districts, there has been no increase in the number of subcounties in
recent years. Since decentralization reforms in the early 1990s, district gov-
ernments have taken responsibility for the provision of health and education
services, with secondary assistance from subcounty governments ðAkin, Hutch-
inson, and Strumpf 2005Þ.
ForUganda’smajor ethnic groups such as the Acholi, Baganda, Basoga, Iteso,
and Langi—members of which account for over 82% of the current population
of Uganda—we can use the Murdock ð1967Þ data directly. However, the
smaller ethnic groups ð34 out of the 56 groups listed in the 2002 censusÞ were
not coded by Murdock ð1967Þ, and thus we have to infer the level of preco-
lonial complexity by using the attributes of a related group.To do sowe used the
Ethnologue database to ﬁnd ethnic groups who speak languages closely related
to those listed in the Ugandan census data, as listed in appendix A. To calculate
the percentage of residents in each local government unit from a centralized
ethnic group, we used the most recent Ugandan census from 2002, which lists
ethnic identity down to the level of the subcounty ðGovernment of Uganda
2002Þ. As noted above, the detailed nature of this data is unusual for African
censuses, and it is also unusual for Ugandan censuses, which have never before
listed ethnic data at the subcounty level.We also consider the use of census data
to be superior to ethnic data used by the other scholarship on African preco-
lonial political centralization discussed above, both because the Murdock data
are from the 1960s and because census data allow individuals to choose their
own identity rather than have it assigned by researchers. Figure 2 displays a
map of Uganda with 80 districts shaded ﬁve different ways according to the
percentage of residents from centralized ethnic groups; the Bantu-dominated
central and southwest region is almost entirely dark, while the northern and
eastern non-Bantu areas are largely white.
In doing so, our measure of precolonial centralization is a more accurate
metric of the transmission of institutions via centralized groups. Not only does
the measure capture the percentage of a given region’s population that was cen-
tralized in the precolonial era, but it also takes into account demographic changes
7 For more on district creation in Uganda, see Green ð2010Þ.
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across the colonial and postcolonial periods that have caused changes in the
proportion of centralized groups in the same region over time.
IV. Empirical Analysis
To examine the centralization hypothesis, we estimate a basic model using
ordinary least squares ðOLSÞ, for the relationship between indicators of pre-
colonial centralization and development
Di 5 a1 bCentralizationi 1Xiγ1 εi; ð1Þ
where Di is a development indicator for regional unit i; Centralizationi is an
indicator of precolonial centralization for regional unit i, as measured by the
Figure 2. District-level map of Uganda
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percentage of residents in each unit from ethnic groups coded with a preco-
lonial centralization score of 2 or higher; X i is a vector of controls for regional
unit i; and εi is an error term assumed to be normally distributed, N ð0; j 2ε Þ.
We also use a series of controls to account for geographical determinants of
contemporary development outcomes.We control for elevation ðin feet, loggedÞ,
average annual rainfall, malaria suitability, and ecological diversity, and we use
dummies to control for whether the district has an international border or access
to large rivers or lakes. Moreover, we control for two types of poor soil content, in
both cases via dummy variables. First we control for lithosols, or orthents, which
are shallow soils and are thus unsuitable for arable farming, as well as vertisols,
which are noted for their high clay content that can only be farmed under a very
narrow range of rainfall conditions. Finally, we control for ethnolinguistic frac-
tionalization ðELFÞ as computed from the 2002 census. More details about all
of the variables can be found in appendix B.
In table 1 we present our ﬁrst set of results: we list the dependent variables in
the ﬁrst column, followed by results without controls and then with controls
alongside the number of observations. We ﬁrst list district-level results. Our
ﬁrst set of data comes from the 2005 United Nations Development Program
ðUNDPÞ Ugandan Human Development Report, which calculated a Human
Development Index ðHDIÞ for each of Uganda’s then 56 districts. The second
set of data comes from the 2007UgandanHumanDevelopment Report, which
calculated not only an updated list of HDIs per district—which came to 76 at
the time of their analysis—but also their component indexes for gross domestic
product ðGDPÞ, literacy, gross primary school enrollment, and life expectancy.8
In the latter two cases the data are not strictly the same as those used by Gen-
naioli and Rainer ð2007Þ but nonetheless function as a good proxy for mea-
suring the quality of education and health in each district, respectively.9 Our
results are all positive and statistically signiﬁcant for the 2005 and 2007 HDIs
as well as the literacy and GDP indexes but not for the gross enrollment or life
expectancy indexes, which both produce negligible coefﬁcients and very low
R2’s, a discrepancy we return to below.
8 The 2005 and 2007 UN HDIs are based on national household survey from 2003 and 2005, re-
spectively. Both surveys covered all districts of Uganda, with the exception in the former case of Pader
as well as some parts of Gulu and Kitgum districts because of the civil war in northern Uganda.
9 Incidentally, Gennaioli and Rainer ð2007, 193Þ note that their results are nearly identical if they
substitute life expectancy for infant mortality. We were unfortunately unable to match Gennaioli
and Rainer’s ð2007Þ analysis for road coverage, as data only exist for 20 districts ðGovernment of
Uganda 2010, 169Þ; we present our results for immunization below.
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Table 1 also reports results with sub-county-level data, here compiled by the
Ugandan Bureau of Statistics. For this data set, we have obtained the poverty
headcount measure and a poverty gap measure that calculates the average gap
in expenditure necessary for the poor in each region to reach the poverty line,
as poverty development indicators. The data on poverty headcount and pov-
erty gaps are estimated using data on household consumption, which them-
selves were modeled using various household characteristics.10 Here we cluster
errors at the district level to account for district-level effects.
In both cases precolonial centralization is statistically signiﬁcant and has the
expected positive sign. Moreover, in many regressions without controls, pre-
10 The household characteristics that were most commonly associated with expenditure patterns
included household size, education, marriage, housing materials, type of toilet, and access to energy
and water ðEmwanu et al. 2007, 71Þ. There is no indication that ethnic identity was used as a
regressor in these models, which would have introduced an element of tautology to our results.
TABLE 1
PRECOLONIAL CENTRALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA: OLS ESTIMATES
Dependent
Variable
Precolonial
Centralization
ðwithout ControlsÞ R 2
Precolonial
Centralization
ðwith ControlsÞ R 2
Number of Local
Government Units
District-level data:a
HDI ð2005Þ .101*** .311 .071*** .498 55
ð.022Þ ð.019Þ
HDI ð2007Þ .086*** .186 .079*** .435 76
ð.021Þ ð.023Þ
Literacy index ð2007Þ .202*** .251 .200*** .483 76
ð.042Þ ð.056Þ
GDP index ð2007Þ .108*** .396 .081*** .534 76
ð.016Þ ð.020Þ
Gross enrollment index ð2007Þ .009 .000 .023 .318 76
ð.089Þ ð.108Þ
Life expectancy index ð2007Þ .010 .002 .020 .318 76
ð.031Þ ð.036Þ
Sub-county-level data
ðfrom 2002Þ:b
Poverty headcount 226.092*** .317 216.218*** .446 958
ð4.197Þ ð3.625Þ
Poverty gap 212.630*** .297 28.021*** .419 956
ð2.219Þ ð1.852Þ
Sources. UNDP ð2005, 2007Þ and Emwanu et al. ð2007Þ.
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a Controls include log of elevation, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, rainfall, ecological diversity, malaria,
and dummies for poor soils ðlithosol and vertisolÞ, access to rivers and lakes, and international borders.
b We cluster standard errors at the district while our controls include ethnolinguistic fractionalization,
ecological diversity, malaria, and dummies for poor soils ðlithosol and vertisolÞ, access to rivers and lakes,
and international borders.
*** p ≤ .01.
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colonial centralization explains a great deal of variation in the dependent
variable; in the case of the poverty headcount, for instance, it alone explains
almost one-third of the variation across 958 subcounties.
We plot the relationship between centralization and the six dependent
variables from table 1 in ﬁgure 3; as can be seen, there are no serious outliers
driving our results. To conﬁrm the lack of outliers, we also computed the
Dfbetas from each regression, removed all values where Dfbeta > 2=
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
—
where n 5 number of observations ðBelsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980, 28Þ—
and reran our regressions, with no differences in our ﬁndings ðwe performed
these tests for all regressions reported in tables 4–6 as well, with no changes in
our results, which are available from authors on requestÞ. We also checked for
and eliminated observations with a high Cook’s Distance; our results again
remained the same.
For additional robustness, we also test an alternative measure of centrali-
zation, where only groups that score 3 are coded as centralized and all others
are recorded as decentralized, a change that especially makes a difference in
eastern Uganda. ðWe cannot, however, perform the exercise using a score of 1
as the threshold, since it only yields six districts with less than half of their
residents from centralized ethnic groups.Þ The results, which are available
from the authors, are even stronger than those in table 1.
We also reran our results excluding all districts and subcounties with less
than 20% of their residents from centralized groups, for two reasons. First, as
seen in ﬁgure 2 there is a strong divide between northern and eastern Uganda,
with almost no residents from centralized groups, and the rest of the country.
Thus, it is of interest to see whether the northern and eastern districts are
driving our results and whether our results would still hold in the southern
and western kingdom areas of Uganda. Second, our dependent variables were
measured during the height of the war involving the Lord’s Resistance Army,
which only affected northern Uganda, and thus the war could be driving our
results as well. However, we found no changes in our results upon excluding the
relevant districts and subcounties.We also excluded all districts withmore than
80% of their residents from centralized groups, again with no changes in our
results. Finally, as Buganda has long been the richest kingdom and was the only
kingdom granted federal status upon independence in 1962, we excluded
Buganda from our results, with no changes. ðAll of these additional results are
available from the authors.Þ
As a further robustness test, we reestimated the above models by cluster-
ing the standard errors in two different ways. First, we cluster the standard
errors at the primary ethnic group level to account for the fact that precolonial
centralization varies with the ethnic group. Second, to account for spatial
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Figure 3. Political centralization and development outcomes ðfrom table 1Þ
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correlation, we estimate Conley standard errors.11 The results for these esti-
mations are in appendix C, table C1, available in the online version of Economic
Development and Cultural Change. Our ﬁndings remain unchanged.
A. Survey-Based Empirical Estimates
We next turn to results from the Afrobarometer Round 4 survey in Uganda,
which in 2008 asked over 2,400 respondents a variety of questions relevant to
our analysis here. The Afrobarometer is a cross-country survey that ﬁrst started
in 1999 and completed four rounds across 19 countries in Africa by 2008; it
measures public attitudes to a variety of social, economic, and political phe-
nomena. It is particularly useful to us for several reasons. First, it allows us to
work with individual-level survey data, thus providing us with an accurate rep-
resentation of the reach of public policies as well as allowing respondents to
freely identify their ethnic groups. Second, it has a very large number of re-
spondents who are well represented across Uganda. Third, it yields a more
representative choice of variables with which we can work than the local gov-
ernment data. More speciﬁcally, while our previous dependent variables focused
on literacy, health, human development, and income and poverty, the Afroba-
rometer survey gives us responses on ownership of assets and access to vital ne-
cessities, all or some of which are often discussed in the literature as being much
more directly related to public expenditures than macrolevel variables such as
HDI indexes, literacy indexes, and income and poverty levels. For our principal
explanatory variable, precolonial centralization, we use the individuals’ response
on his or her ethnic identity to create a dummy variable that captures whether
the respondent’s ethnic groupwas centralized. The data set also provides uswith
a variety of socioeconomic variables that we use as controls, such as age, age2, a
dummy for gender andhousehold head, and subcountyELF. For our dependent
variable, we use responses to questions on access to vital necessities in the past
year, namely, food, water,medical care, cooking fuel, and cash income. Responses
to the questions range from never ðcoded as 0Þ to always ðcoded 4Þ.
The relationship we estimate is given by equation ð2Þ, and we use an or-
dered logit to estimate it.
Ci 5 d1 vCentralizationDummyi 1Xiλ1 εi; ð2Þ
11 For the estimation of the Conley standard errors presented in the tables, we chose the distance at
which spatial correlation is assumed to vanish to be 300 kilometers, which is the maximum width of
Uganda’s east-to-west borders ðto account for the fact that levels of precolonial centralization vary
little along longitudinal linesÞ. We have also set the value to be lesser values ð50, 100, 200Þ with no
changes in the estimated Conley standard errors.
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where Ci corresponds to a response to the question “Gone without __ in past
year” ð0–4, with 0 5 never and 4 5 alwaysÞ for individual i. We perform
estimations with responses to all ﬁve questions ðq5a–q5eÞ asked on food,
water, medical care, cooking fuel, and cash income. Whether the respondent’s
ethnic group was centralized is captured by CentralizationDummyi, Xi is a
vector of controls for individual i, and ε i is an error term assumed to follow the
logistic distribution. Table 2 presents ordered logit estimates of equation ð2Þ.
In table 2 we present estimates of logit regressions of a similar relationship
of precolonial centralization with the ownership of assets such as a radio,
television, and a car or motorcycle. We estimate the following relationship:
Ai 5 m1 rCentralizationDummyi 1Xiw1 ni; ð3Þ
where Ai corresponds to a response to the question “Personally own a ___”
ð0 5 no and 1 5 yesÞ for individual i, Xi is a vector of controls ðthe same
TABLE 2
PRECOLONIAL CENTRALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA, AFROBAROMETER SURVEY DATA
Dependent Variable
Precolonial
Centralization
Dummy Controls Observations
Subcounty
Clusters Pseudo-R 2
Ordered logit regressions:
Gone without ___ in the
past year ð0–4, with 0 5 never
and 4 5 alwaysÞ:
Food 21.271*** Yes 2,410 168 .062
ð.134Þ
Clean water 2.757*** Yes 2,415 168 .020
ð.126Þ
Medical care 2.565*** Yes 2,413 168 .015
ð.135Þ
Cooking fuel 2.770*** Yes 2,412 168 .015
ð.126Þ
Cash income 2.388*** Yes 2,410 168 .023
ð.121Þ
Logit regressions:
Personally own a ___ ð0 5 no,
1 5 yesÞ:
Radio .341*** Yes 2,416 168 .048
ð.132Þ
Television .602** Yes 2,416 168 .076
ð.241Þ
Car or motorcycle .374* Yes 2,416 168 .053
ð.195Þ
Note. Robust standard errors clustered at the subcounty level in parentheses. Controls include age, age2,
gender, head of household dummy, and subcounty ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
* p ≤ .1.
** p ≤ .05.
*** p ≤ .01.
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controls used as for estimating model 2Þ for individual i, and ni is an error term
assumed to follow the logistic distribution.
In all cases, we cluster the standard errors at the subcounty level, with our
results robust to clustering at alternative levels of local government as well.
Our results are unequivocal: all of the coefﬁcients of the centralization variable
have the correct sign and are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better,
with the sole exception of car or motorcycle ownership, which is signiﬁcant at
the 10% level.
We also use two additional sets of survey results. First, we use a survey con-
ducted by a joint team from Uganda and the World Bank in 2010, the Uganda
Migration Household Survey. While the subject of the survey was international
migration and remittances, surveyors nonetheless asked about ethnicity as well as
asked a wide range of questions about asset ownership that allow us to use the
survey results here. We estimate model 3 using a logistic regression, where Ai
corresponds to a response to the question “Has/Owns ___” ð0 5 no and 1 5
yesÞ for individual i. Here we control for age, age2, gender, the number of people
in the household, and urbanization; since the subcounties are not listed in the
data set, we control for district-level ELF and cluster the standard errors at the
enumeration level. ðAs before, the results are robust to clustering at the district
level aswell.Þ For brevity, we present the results in tableC3; as can be seen, for the
17 questions the precolonial centralization variable has the expected sign in 15
regressions and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better in 12 regressions.
Second, we use the 1988UgandanDemographic andHealth Survey ðDHSÞ.
Rather than using the most recent DHS data from Uganda, we deliberately
focused on the ﬁrst DHS survey, which was conducted across most of Uganda
in 1988–89 among women age 15–49. The timing of the DHS survey is in-
teresting for our purposes, as it was conducted just after Uganda emerged from
a 20-year period of rule by members of noncentralized ethnic groups. If, as
has been suggested elsewhere ðFrank and Rainer 2012Þ, African rulers favor
their own ethnic groups, we should expect to see centralized groups to have
suffered signiﬁcantly under the rule of Obote and Amin relative to non-
centralized groups. Nonetheless, as reported in table C4, we ﬁnd a robust
relationship between centralization and measures of educational achievement,
literacy, and asset ownership when controlling for age, age2, urbanization, and
marital status.
V. Instrumental Variable Regressions
It is possible that the relationship between precolonial economic development
and contemporary economic development is a consequence of reverse cau-
sality, whereby precolonial development led both to the emergence of pre-
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colonial states and to the persistence of economic development outcomes to
the present day.12 One way to deal with this problem is to use an instrumental
variable analysis; of course, ﬁnding an instrument for precolonial centraliza-
tion at the country level is extremely difﬁcult given the complex precolonial
history of Africa. However, the use of the Ugandan case study here simpliﬁes
the search for such an instrument given the large literature on precolonial state
formation in Uganda.
Here we employ the log of distance from Mubende town as an instrument
for precolonial political complexity.13 Mubende town, in what is now Mu-
bende district, was the legendary capital of the medieval Bacwezi empire es-
tablished by King Ndahura, who supposedly “conquered lands in various di-
rections” from his capital ðChrétien 2003, 97Þ. While much of the history of
the Bacwezi is shrouded in uncertainty, recent archeological evidence suggests a
signiﬁcant human presence at Mubende between 1275 and 1400 ðRobertshaw
and Taylor 2000, 16Þ.14 Moreover, historians are much more certain about the
precolonial history of the kingdom of Bunyoro, whose capital was established at
Mubende at one point and which spawned the other neighboring kingdoms of
southern and western Uganda over subsequent centuries ðOliver 1955, 115;
Chrétien 2003, 103Þ. We plot the relationship between the log of distance and
precolonial centralization for 79 districts in ﬁgure 4; because we are forced to
drop Mubende district, the number of observations decreases by one in relation
to table 1. As is clear, the relationship is not driven by any outliers, and distance
fromMubende explains a majority of the variation in precolonial centralization.
Mubende, of course, is in Buganda and thus not particularly far from Kam-
pala, which is the political and economic hub of the country. It is thus possible
that any relationship between distance from Mubende and political central-
ization could be a result of migrants who move toward Kampala for economic
reasons and eventually assimilate into more centralized groups indigenous to
the area. To allow for this possibility, we add a control for log of distance from
Kampala.
12 In a recent paper, Fenske ð2014Þ demonstrates that the development of centralized states in
Africa was a consequence of the potential for trade, as proxied by a measure of ecological diversity.
However, note that Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson ð2013Þ ﬁnd no relationship between trade and
centralization in precolonial Africa when using data on trade from Murdock ð1967Þ.
13 We measure geodesic or great circle distance through the Haversine formula.
14 Robertshaw and Taylor ð2000Þ also discuss evidence of an earlier settlement at Ntusi, some 65
kilometers southwest of Mubende in what it is now the neighboring district of Sembabule; while
there is no legend attaching Ntusi to the growth of the region’s subsequent kingdoms, the evidence
nonetheless does suggest the existence of a centralized chiefdom some 200 years earlier than at
Mubende. If we use an instrument measuring distance from Ntusi rather than from Mubende, we
obtain essentially the same results as reported here ðresults available from authorsÞ.
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In table 3 we regress precolonial centralization on distance from Mubende
for the two data sets of districts and the subcounties alongside distance from
Kampala and other geographical controls, namely, elevation, malaria, ecolog-
ical diversity, access to rivers and lakes, rainfall, and poor soil as measured by
lithosol and vertisol dummy variables. Distance fromMubende is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant, with p-values lower than 0.001 for all three regressions;
vertisols and lithosols are also strongly and weakly signiﬁcant, respectively, both
in the expected direction.15 It is notable that distance from Kampala is not
statistically signiﬁcant in either of the two district-level regressions. Finally, the
F-statistic in all three regressions is high, suggesting that distance from Mu-
bende is a strong instrument.16
As with any instrumental variable, the question arises as to whether distance
fromMubende has inﬂuenced contemporary developmental outcomes via chan-
nels other than precolonial centralization. For instance, it is plausible that the
areas near Mubende where centralized polities were established in the pre-
colonial period had better climatic conditions for agriculture and thus had
higher levels of development that have persisted to the present day. However,
the controls for soil, rainfall, and elevation in table 3 fail to remove the statistical
15 We do not include vertisol and lithosol as instruments since bivariate regressions show that they
explain much smaller percentages of the variation in complexity than does distance from Mubende;
nonetheless, our results are robust to the use of both soil types as additional instruments ðresults
available from authorsÞ.
16 We reproduce our analysis in table 3 using clustered standard errors at the primary ethnic group
level and Conley standard errors in table C2, with no changes in our results.
Figure 4. Log of distance from Mubende and precolonial centralization
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signiﬁcance of the variable measuring distance from Mubende. Moreover, his-
torical evidence suggests that the center of power for Bunyoro had shifted
northward fromMubende far before independence. From the late eighteenth to
the mid-nineteenth centuries, its capitals were located in what is now Kibaale
district ðNyakatura 1973, 88, 92, 98Þ, while its late nineteenth-century capitals
were in what are now Hoima and Masindi districts ðDoyle 2006, 39Þ. The
colonial period saw the establishment of the capitals of Bunyoro in the towns of
Hoima ð1900–1912 and 1924–presentÞ and, as noted above, Masindi ð1912–
24Þ, while the new railway system that was constructed from Kasese in western
Uganda all the way to Nairobi and the Indian Ocean coast bypassed Mubende
ðas can be seen in ﬁg. 1Þ. The result is that Mubende today remains a relative
backwater town in one of the poorer parts of Buganda kingdom, suggesting
that proximity to Mubende does not have any direct effect on contemporary
developmental outcomes.
Viewing the results in table 3 as the ﬁrst stage of our instrumental variable
analysis, we now estimate equation ð1Þ as the second-stage regression and pre-
sent our second-stage results in table 4. As before, all but the enrollment and life
TABLE 3
DETERMINANTS OF PRECOLONIAL CENTRALIZATION IN UGANDA: OLS ESTIMATES
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ
Mubende distance ðlogÞ 2.336*** 2.364*** 2.397***
ð.069Þ ð.065Þ ð.066Þ
Kampala distance ðlogÞ 2.061* 2.078 2.099***
ð.036Þ ð.046Þ ð.035Þ
Lithosol 2.093 2.072 2.119**
ð.074Þ ð.060Þ ð.049Þ
Vertisol 2.218* 2.159** 2.130**
ð.082Þ ð.069Þ ð.055Þ
Malaria 2.193 2.263 2.468**
ð.229Þ ð.171Þ ð.224Þ
Ecological diversity .188 .336 .060
ð.244Þ ð.211Þ ð.239Þ
Access to rivers/lakes .098 .081 .047
ð.073Þ ð.069Þ ð.083Þ
Elevation ðlogÞ .298 .130
ð.229Þ ð.173Þ
Rainfall 2.065* 2.053**
ð.033Þ ð.027Þ
N 54 75 957
R 2 .660 .612 .498
F-statistic 22.88 30.33 29.98
Prob > F .000 .000 .000
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses ðclustered at the district level in col. 3Þ.
* p ≤ .1.
** p ≤ .05.
*** p ≤ .01.
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expectancy variables are both statistically signiﬁcant and in the expected di-
rection. The enrollment variable is not signiﬁcant without controls and only
weakly signiﬁcant with controls; life expectancy, however, is negative and sig-
niﬁcant, indicating that areas with people from more centralized ethnic groups
have lower average levels of life expectancy. The coefﬁcient for centralization is
higher for the results at the district level but is almost the same for the sub-
county data set.
VI. Testing Mechanisms and Interpretation
There are three competing hypotheses for the relationship between precolo-
nial centralization and contemporary development. First, areas that were al-
TABLE 4
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE RESULTS
Dependent Variable
Precolonial Centralization
ðwithout ControlsÞ
Precolonial Centralization
ðwith ControlsÞ
Number of Local
Government Units
District-level data:a
HDI ð2005Þ .135*** .228*** 54
ð.035Þ ð.080Þ
HDI ð2007Þ .109*** .176*** 75
ð.035Þ ð.052Þ
Literacy index
ð2007Þ .331*** .577*** 75
ð.062Þ ð.110Þ
GDP index ð2007Þ .149*** .186*** 75
ð.021Þ ð.040Þ
Gross enrollment
index ð2007Þ .183 .554* 75
ð.140Þ ð.257Þ
Life expectancy
index ð2007Þ 2.102** 2.222*** 75
ð.041Þ ð.083Þ
Sub-county-level data
ðfrom 2002Þ:b
Poverty headcount 235.073*** 222.863*** 957
ð6.208Þ ð6.931Þ
Poverty gap 218.073*** 213.181*** 955
ð3.601Þ ð3.728Þ
Sources. UNDP ð2005, 2007Þ and Emwanu et al. ð2007Þ.
Note. Two-stage least squares estimates with log of distance from Mubende as an instrument for pre-
colonial centralization. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a Controls include log of elevation, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, rainfall, ecological diversity, malaria,
and dummies for poor soils ðlithosol and vertisolÞ, access to rivers and lakes, and international borders.
b We cluster standard errors at the district while our controls include ethnolinguistic fractionalization,
ecological diversity, malaria, and dummies for poor soils ðlithosol and vertisolÞ, access to rivers and lakes,
and international borders.
* p ≤ .1.
** p ≤ .05.
*** p ≤ .01.
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ready developed in the precolonial period have remained more developed to
the present day, a mechanism that we call here the “persistence” hypothesis.
Second, it could be that centralized ethnic groups have more legitimate local
chiefs and that these chiefs thereby have both better incentives and a better
ability to implement modernization programs. Third, the relationship could
be driven by national-level mechanisms, whereby centralized ethnic groups
improve national-level development patterns. Since we are attempting to ex-
plain within-country differences, we can obviously eliminate the third hypoth-
esis, which leaves us with the ﬁrst two hypotheses.
Both Gennaioli and Rainer ð2007Þ and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
ð2013Þ propose that the second mechanism, which the former call the “local
accountability” hypothesis, is correct. To do so, Gennaioli and Rainer ð2007Þ
split each country’s population along a 2  2 matrix of two binary variables,
namely, centralization and class stratiﬁcation, with the latter variable also taken
from Murdock ð1967Þ. They then designate various types of public goods as
characterized by high levels of geographic spillover ðeducation and infant mor-
talityÞ, such that local chiefs are forced to cooperate, and low levels of spillover
ðpaved roads and immunizationÞ, which instead have little inﬂuence outside the
community in question. As such Gennaioli and Rainer ð2007Þ predict that for
low-spillover goods the beneﬁts of precolonial centralization will be higher for
more stratiﬁed groups, since such groups would have particularly poor public
goods provision due to class divisions. In the converse, however, for high-
spillover goods the effect of precolonial centralization should be uniform across
stratiﬁed and egalitarian groups. The authors’ cross-national results appear to
conﬁrm these hypotheses.
Data limitations prevent us from undertaking the same exercise here, as
data on stratiﬁcation are missing for various major ethnic groups, while in-
ferring data from related groups is more difﬁcult with stratiﬁcation as it does
not correspond to linguistic differences in the same way as centralization. Gen-
naioli and Rainer ð2007Þ also test for a variety of other measurements of pre-
colonial advancement for which there are no subnational data available for
Uganda or there is little to no variation at the subnational level, such as being
landlocked or nomadic.
However, we have a variety of other data that allow us to test for mecha-
nisms here, both at the district and the individual levels. If the persistence
mechanism is correct, then its effects should be obvious at the individual level
and not just the local government level; moreover, if true, it implies that areas
dominated by individuals from centralized ethnic groups should have higher
access to private goods than other areas but that centralized areas should not
necessarily have better public goods. If instead it is the local accountability
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hypothesis that is correct, we should see a set of correlations between central-
ization and public goods outcomes. Inasmuch as the local accountability hy-
pothesis relies on the higher levels of legitimacy for local governments in more
centralized areas, we should also observe higher levels of local government per-
formance in more centralized areas.
We can reexamine our results from tables 1 and 4 in this regard, whereby
the positive relationship between centralization and district-level HDI was
driven by GDP and literacy but not by school enrollment or life expectancy.
GDP can be interpreted as a measure of private goods, since government ex-
penditure has remained around 16% of GDP since the 1990s ðFan and Zhang
2008Þ. School enrollment and life expectancy are more obvious measures of
public goods, since they are heavily inﬂuenced by government spending on
education and health, respectively.17 While literacy at ﬁrst appears to be a
measure of public good provision, it has higher levels of correlation with GDP
ðr5 0.73Þ than with primary school enrollment ðr5 0.60Þ or life expectancy
ðr 5 20.11Þ.18 Indeed, evidence from Uganda suggests that despite the
abolition of school fees, households still have to cover indirect private costs
such as meals, uniforms, and transportation ðNishimura, Yamano, and Sa-
saoka 2008Þ, which means that those who achieve literacy are not necessarily
just those who attend school but those who also have additional levels of private
wealth. These results thus seem to provide evidence for the persistence thesis
over the local accountability thesis.
As for table 2, all of our results provide additional evidence of the link
between centralization and private goods. The negative relationship between
centralization and going without medical care might indicate that centralized
areas have better access to public health care. However, most health care in
Uganda is provided privately through either traditional healers or private prac-
titioners ðBirungi et al. 2001; Nuwaha 2002; Xu et al. 2006Þ, which suggests
that here again centralization is correlated with private rather than public goods.
We also test these two hypotheses with a variety of data on public goods
provision at the district level in table 5. We ﬁrst use the most recent gov-
ernment data on access to safe drinking water ðin 2008Þ and the percentage of
17 For an overview of recent evidence supporting life expectancy as a measure of public goods, see
Deaton ð2013Þ.
18 High levels of correlation between literacy and GDP at the national level have led to a series of
criticisms of the HDI going back to its inception ðcf. McGillivray 1991 and, more recently,
Høyland, Moene, and Willumsen 2011Þ. Because of this problem as well as additional concerns
about the measurement of literacy, the UNDP replaced literacy and gross enrollment rates as
measures of education with mean and expected years of schooling in 2010.
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district health posts that were actually ﬁlled ðin 2009Þ.19 Moreover, we use a
number of different measures from the most recent Ugandan Statistical Year-
book before themost recent expansion in the number of districts ðGovernment
of Uganda 2010Þ. We ﬁrst measure the total number of health centers per
10,000 inhabitants as well as the average level of coverage between 2007 and
2009 for all four different types of immunization assessed by the Statistical
Yearbook: BCG ðagainst tuberculosisÞ, DPT ðagainst diphtheria, pertussis, and
19 Note the difference in the variables measuring how often per year a household went without
clean water from table 2 and access to clean water in table 5. In Uganda water, like electricity, is
provided by the state with the goal of achieving universal access to all citizens, with the caveat that it
is charged at various tariffs. Thus, poor households might have access to water supplies but might
not be able to purchase clean water year-round.
TABLE 5
PRECOLONIAL CENTRALIZATION AND PUBLIC GOODS IN UGANDA: OLS ESTIMATES
Dependent Variable
Precolonial
Centralization Controls R 2 Number of Districts
Access to safe drinking water 2.029 Yes .180 76
ð.075Þ
Percentage of district health posts filled 2.089 Yes .148 80
ð.066Þ
Health centers per 10,000 inhabitants 2.063 Yes .141 80
ð.268Þ
BCG immunization 23.327 Yes .275 80
ð6.679Þ
Measles immunization 219.325*** Yes .250 80
ð7.245Þ
Oral polio vaccine 217.313*** Yes .276 80
ð6.574Þ
DPT immunization 216.368** Yes .189 80
ð7.471Þ
Gross intake rate 217.389 Yes .174 80
ð19.849Þ
Net intake rate 3.941 Yes .095 80
ð6.906Þ
Gross enrollment rate 212.296 Yes .213 80
ð13.180Þ
Net enrollment rate 26.642 Yes .168 80
ð9.188Þ
Sources. UNDP ð2007Þ and Government of Uganda ð2008, 2009, 2010Þ.
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls include log of elevation, ethnolinguistic fraction-
alization, rainfall, ecological diversity, malaria, and dummies for poor soils ðlithosol and vertisolÞ, access to
rivers and lakes, and international borders. Data for the dependent variable are from Government of
Uganda ð2008Þ for the ﬁrst row, Government of Uganda ð2009Þ for the second row, and Government of
Uganda ð2010Þ for the rest of the table. Dependent variables for the last eight rows are all based on the
average measurement between 2007 and 2009.
** p ≤ .05.
*** p ≤ .01.
Bandyopadhyay and Green 493
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.071 on May 12, 2016 01:33:23 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
tetanusÞ, measles, and oral polio vaccines. Finally, we use data on all four
indicators for primary education assessed by the Statistical Yearbook, namely,
gross intake rate, net intake rate, gross enrollment rate, and net enrollment
rate. ðSee app. B for more details on the differences between these variables.Þ
As with immunization, in all four cases we take the average level between 2007
and 2009.
The model estimated is given by
Gi 5 ζ1 fCentralizationDummyi 1Hiυ1 qi; ð4Þ
where Gi is the development outcome variable ðeither an education or life
expectancy or health outcomeÞ, Hi is a vector of controls for regional unit i,
and qi is an error term assumed to be normally distributed, N ð0; j 2qÞ. Equa-
tion ð4Þ is estimated using OLS.
Our results, as reported in table 5, show a striking lack of correlation be-
tween precolonial centralization and these 11 variables measuring education
and health outcomes. Indeed, with all four immunization variables we observe
a negative relationship between centralization and public goods provision, al-
though this result is not robust to dropping soil types as control variables.
Of course, the lack of any relationship between centralization and these edu-
cation and health outcomes could be the result of central government decisions
rather than local government policies. However, as noted above, education and
health spending in Uganda have been decentralized since the early 1990s, with
district and subcounty governments receiving 35% and 42% of all locally gen-
erated revenue, respectively ðFrancis and James 2003, 328Þ. Indeed, in one noted
study, scholars found that not only was actual local government spending on
nonwage education expenditures a fraction of its budget, but it varied signiﬁ-
cantly across regions, suggesting a strong degree of local autonomy over educa-
tion spending ðReinikka and Svensson 2004Þ. The possibility still remains that
the national government has somehow inﬂuenced public goods provision so that
the Banyankole kin of President Museveni have better services, which conforms
to previous work on ethnic favoritism in Africa ðFranck and Rainer 2012Þ.
However, when we either exclude all Banyankole or the Ankole region from our
analysis our results do not change ðresults available from authorsÞ.20
If, according to the local accountability hypothesis, there should be a posi-
tive correlation between centralization and local government accountability
20 It could well be that previous governments led by members of centralized ethnic groups have
inﬂuenced contemporary public goods provision. However, from independence up to 1986 Uganda
was led almost entirely by members of noncentralized groups, with the sole exception of the interim
presidency of Yusuf Lule from 1979 to 1980.
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and performance, then we should also be able to observe this relationship using
Afrobarometer data. The Afrobarometer records information on citizens’ trust
in local government, local government corruption, the degree to which citizens
feel that local government councilors listen to them, and the performance of
local governments in handling the following items: maintaining roads, main-
taining market places, maintaining food standards at restaurants and food stalls,
keeping the council clean, collecting license fees and property taxes, making
their work known to citizens, providing information about their budgets, al-
lowing citizens to participate in decision making, consulting others, handling
complaints, and using government revenues well. We estimate model 4 using
ordered logit regressions, with Afrobarometer variables on service provision as
our dependent variables.
If numerous individuals from centralized ethnic groups recently migrated
from their homelands to more poorly governed areas, then our analysis would
fail to pick up any relationship between centralization and public goods pro-
vision. Thus we change our independent variable of interest here from a cen-
tralization dummy based on each individual’s ethnic identity to one that mea-
sures the percentage of people in each subcounty from centralized ethnic groups,
as in tables 1 and 4.21 In all cases we use the same set of control variables as in
table 2 and cluster errors at the subcounty level. The results, which can be found
in table 6, demonstrate a notable lack of correlation between subcounty pre-
colonial centralization and perceptions of local government performance, which
in most cases results in a negative ðalbeit nonsigniﬁcantÞ relationship that is also
quantitatively small.
As an additional robustness check, we return to our subcounty data on
poverty from table 1. If the operating mechanism is the quality of local in-
stitutions, speciﬁcally ethnic institutions that originate in the precolonial era,
then the relationship between centralization and development should be evi-
dent across areas with different ethnic institutions but not within areas sharing
the same institutions. However, if instead the operating mechanism is the
persistence of wealth within ethnic groups, then the relationship between cen-
tralization and development should be evident within the same region, as long
as there is enough variation in the percentage of people from centralized ethnic
groups.
To examine which mechanism is operating in our Ugandan case study,
we reestimate our regressions from table 1 using a series of subsamples, as
21 As an additional measure, we eliminated from our analysis all members of nonindigenous ethnic
groups in each district, as measured in the 2002 census, with no changes in our results ðavailable on
requestÞ.
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TABLE 6
PRECOLONIAL CENTRALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA: ORDERED LOGIT ESTIMATES
Dependent Variable
Precolonial
Centralization
Percentage Controls Observations
Subcounty
Clusters Pseudo-R 2
Trust in LG ð0–3; 0 5 none,
3 5 a lotÞ .014 Yes 2,356 168 .005
ð.183Þ
Degree of LG corruption
ð0–3; 0 5 none, 3 5 a lotÞ .182 Yes 2,241 168 .002
ð.169Þ
LG councilors listen to people
like me ð0–3; 0 5 none,
3 5 a lotÞ 2.125 Yes 2,368 168 .005
ð.194Þ
How does the LG handle the
following item ð1–4; 1 5
very badly, 4 5 very wellÞ:
Maintains local roads .054 Yes 2,403 168 .002
ð.221Þ
Maintains marketplaces 2.184 Yes 2,343 168 .002
ð.196Þ
Maintains food health
standards 2.272 Yes 2,318 168 .004
ð.179Þ
Keeps council clean 2.155 Yes 2,348 168 .002
ð.167Þ
Collects license fees .194 Yes 1,803 168 .004
ð.195Þ
Collects property tax .099 Yes 1,623 168 .002
ð.180Þ
Makes work known to ordinary
people 2.317* Yes 2,219 168 .006
ð.189Þ
Provides information about
budgets 2.452** Yes 2,200 168 .008
ð.182Þ
Allows citizens to participate
in decisions 2.123 Yes 2,245 168 .004
ð.190Þ
Consults others 2.339* Yes 2,101 168 .006
ð.197Þ
Handles complaints 2.319 Yes 2,130 168 .002
ð.203Þ
Uses government revenues well 2.154 Yes 2,095 168 .004
ð.207Þ
Source. Afrobarometer Survey Data
Note. Robust standard errors clustered at the subcounty level in parentheses. Controls include age, age2,
gender, head of household dummy, and subcounty ethnolinguistic fractionalization. LG 5 local govern-
ment.
* p ≤ .1.
** p ≤ .05.
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presented in table 7. First, we take a subsample of just the areas that were
historically governed by kingdom governments ði.e., the districts formerly
under the rule of Ankole, Buganda, Bunyoro, Busoga, and ToroÞ. As seen in
column 1, the coefﬁcient of precolonial centralization diminishes in size for
both dependent variables ðpoverty headcount and poverty gapÞ but remains
statistically signiﬁcant in this subsample. Second, we examine this relationship
within individual kingdoms in four of the ﬁve kingdoms that exhibit variation
at the subcounty level in the percentage of residents from centralized groups.
ðThe ﬁfth, Buganda, has no subcounties with less than 40% of their residents
from centralized groups, in contrast to the other four kingdoms, all of which
have at least one subcounty with less than 5% of its residents from centralized
groups.Þ The results are again consistent with those obtained using the larger
sample for both poverty headcount and poverty gap, with similarly sized co-
efﬁcients of precolonial centralization and high levels of statistical signiﬁcance.
The only exception here is the kingdom of Busoga, where the coefﬁcients of
precolonial centralization have the correct sign but are not statistically signiﬁ-
cant; one possible explanation for this result is that Busoga is alone among the
kingdoms in receiving a centralization mark of 2 rather than 3 in Murdock
TABLE 7
PRECOLONIAL CENTRALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA, SUBCOUNTY SUBSAMPLES: OLS ESTIMATES
Kingdoms
Only
Ankole
Only
Bunyoro
Only
Busoga
Only
Toro
Only
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ
Dependent variable 5 poverty
headcount:
Precolonial 219.706*** 220.302*** 219.775** 231.474 217.819**
Centralization ð3.621Þ ð2.014Þ ð5.311Þ ð18.748Þ ð6.290Þ
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 488 90 46 82 68
Districts 31 7 4 7 5
R 2 .195 .224 .582 .127 .432
Dependent variable 5 poverty gap:
Precolonial 27.756*** 26.238*** 27.847* 211.156 26.070*
Centralization ð1.505Þ ð1.572Þ ð2.702Þ ð7.436Þ ð2.787Þ
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 488 90 46 82 68
Districts 31 7 4 7 5
R 2 .244 .119 .755 .105 .295
Sources. UNDP ð2005, 2007Þ and Emwanu et al. ð2007Þ.
Note. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. Controls include ethnolinguistic
fractionalization, ecological diversity, malaria, and dummies for poor soils ðlithosol and vertisolÞ, access to
rivers and lakes, and international borders.
* p ≤ .1.
** p ≤ .05.
*** p ≤ .01.
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ð1967Þ, in large part because it was not a kingdom in the precolonial era.22 For
robustness, we also estimate equations ð2Þ and ð3Þ using DHS data for king-
dom areas only, with the same results as above, as listed in table C5.
Finally, our results here could be the result of a clash between traditional
authorities from centralized ethnic groups and contemporary local govern-
ment ofﬁcials. More speciﬁcally, it could be that local accountability explained
a divergence in public goods provisions across Uganda in previous decades
when traditional authorities held control over local government administra-
tion but that this link was broken when Milton Obote abolished the political
role of Uganda’s kingdoms in the 1960s. Indeed, after the kingdoms were
restored under President Museveni’s government in 1993, they have clashed
with the central government on such issues as land ownership. However, there
is little evidence that the kingdoms have attempted to stymie the provision of
local public goods; if anything, the kabaka ðkingÞ of Buganda and other king-
dom leaders have explicitly encouraged their subjects to attend school and get
immunized ðNasamula 2012Þ.
To sum up this section, the set of results presented in table 5 show a striking
lack of correlation between precolonial centralization and education and health
public goods, while in table 6 the results showed a lack of correlation between
precolonial centralization and local government accountability and perfor-
mance. These results contrast strongly with the results presented in tables 1, 2,
and 4, which clearly showed a strong relationship between precolonial cen-
tralization and measurements such as GDP, poverty, and asset ownership. This
dual set of results is highly supportive of the persistence hypothesis, in that
precolonial centralization is correlated with contemporary access to private
goods rather than public goods.
VII. Conclusion
In this article we tested the hypothesis that precolonial political centralization
is a determinant of postcolonial African development by using the case of
Uganda. Employing a wide variety of evidence from UNDP, Afrobarometer,
DHS, and Ugandan government sources, we showed that precolonial cen-
tralization is signiﬁcantly correlated with contemporary local measurements of
GDP, poverty, and asset ownership, a result that is robust to the use of various
control variables and distance from the ancient capital of Mubende as an in-
strumental variable. However, we also showed that precolonial centralization is
22 Although Busoga does have a history of chiefdoms, it only received its ﬁrst king ðkyabazingaÞ in
1939. After independence, however, it enjoyed the same semifederal status as Ankole, Bunyoro, and
Toro and like the other kingdoms was restored on a nonpolitical basis in the 1990s.
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correlated neither with public goods provision in the case of health and educa-
tion nor with local government accountability or efﬁcacy.
Our results therefore suggest a correlation between precolonial centraliza-
tion and private rather than public goods, leading us to propose that levels of
wealth have persisted in Uganda from the precolonial period to the present
day. Indeed, the qualitative historical record supports this conclusion in four
ways. In the ﬁrst case, we can document a positive effect of precolonial states
on local welfare. Centralized states were able to introduce new technologies,
coordinate labor supplies, and build roads, whereas noncentralized areas could
not, in part because political instability contributed to short time horizons
ðOsafo-Kwaako and Robinson 2013Þ. Indeed, states like Buganda and Bun-
yoro not only were centers of wealth but had the ability to use this wealth to
feed the poor in times of famine ðDoyle 2006, 31Þ. Precolonial Uganda is no
unique in this regard: as noted by McCaskie ð2003, 31Þ, precolonial states like
the Asante in West Africa “cannot be remotely classiﬁed as an economy of
generalized want and hunger.” Moreover, such states could hold a monopoly
of violence within their territories, thereby preserving wealth and assets in
contrast to less centralized areas such as Teso that suffered from high levels of
warfare ðLawrance 1957, 3Þ. Indeed, recent evidence from Depetris-Chauvin
ð2015Þ suggests that long-term exposure to statehood in Africa is negatively
correlated with conﬂict.
Second, there is recent evidence that precolonial centralization is actually
negatively correlated with contemporary levels of democracy outside Europe,
whereby the spread of colonial institutions was hindered by strong precolonial
states ðHariri 2012Þ. In other words, precolonial centralization appears to be
correlated with lower rather than higher levels of political accountability today,
at least at the country level. It does not require a large leap of the imagination
to suppose that the same mechanisms would have worked at the subnational
level within Uganda and other African countries that exhibited large variation
in levels of precolonial political centralization, such that precolonial central-
ization would not have a positive effect on contemporary institutions at the
local level. Moreover, as noted in Section III above, in Uganda as elsewhere
in Africa the colonial period saw the introduction of chieftaincies to non-
centralized areas, whose persistence to the present day has meant that insti-
tutional differences across centralized and noncentralized areas have long been
minimal.23
23 Thus, the roles that many ethnic chiefs play today in the provision of public services may indeed
be important ðMichalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013Þ, but it remains an open question as to
whether chiefs in centralized areas are more or less accountable than those in noncentralized areas.
For instance, Baldwin ð2013Þ suggests that patterns of precolonial centralization have no effect on
the relationship between chiefs and subjects in contemporary Zambia.
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Third, people in centralized precolonial states were generally better off than
stateless people because of the effects of states predating on stateless people,
particularly through slave-raiding. The effects of the intercontinental slave
trade on African underdevelopment have already been explored by Nunn
ð2008Þ, who ﬁnds a robust relationship between the number of slaves ex-
ported and contemporary GDP per capita; Nunn and Wantchekon ð2011Þ
suggest that the relevant mechanism here was the way in which slavery led
to greater levels of mistrust within Africa. Indeed, in precolonial sub-Saharan
Africa, land was abundant while labor was scarce, which meant that poverty
at the time was more deﬁned by a lack of access to labor than to land ðIliffe
1987Þ. Slave-raiding was therefore the ideal way to alleviate labor shortages,
especially by raiding neighboring groups ðLovejoy 2000Þ. In precolonial Uganda,
the Bunyoro state would often raid for slaves among the Alur of northwest
Uganda ðDoyle 2006, 37Þ, while neighboring Acholi, Lugbara, and Madi
people were similarly targeted by Arabic slave traders from what is now Sudan
ðLeopold 2006, 181–85Þ.24 The effect of such raids was to negatively affect
not only those who became slaves but also those left behind where labor was
even more scarce than it had been before, thereby only exacerbating precolo-
nial inequalities between centralized and stateless peoples.25 The nature of the
impact of precolonial slavery within Africa on postcolonial development—as
opposed to the effects of the intercontinental slave trade—remains, however,
a topic for further discussion.
Fourth and ﬁnally, recent evidence from economic history suggests that
states have not done as well as previously thought in eliminating inequalities
of wealth through redistribution ðClark 2014Þ. Attempts at interregional re-
distribution in Uganda, as elsewhere in Africa, have been notably absent, with
equalization grants given to poorer districts comprising only 0.5% of all central
government funding to districts ðBitarabeho 2008Þ. Colonial policies of in-
direct rule and a lack of redistribution policies under previous governments—
with the exception of elite accumulation at high levels of government—have
thus meant that wealth in Uganda and Africa more widely has not been re-
24 Michalopoulos and Papaioannou ð2013Þ attempt to control for this possibility by introducing a
dummy variable measuring the existence/nonexistence of slavery within each ethnic group; they ﬁnd
no statistical relationship between this slavery variable and light intensity. However, the existence of
slavery was not necessarily correlated with slave raiding; the Alur and Lugbara, to take two examples,
are both recorded by Murdock ð1967Þ as using slaves yet suffered from slave-raiding much more
than they gained.
25 For evidence outside Africa, see Scott ð2009Þ, who suggests that stateless peoples in southeast
Asia deliberately refused to adopt writing in order to frustrate state attempts at capturing and
classifying them; being preliterate ðor postliterate as Scott ½2009 calls themÞ would have also
inhibited economic development in obvious ways.
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distributed from richer areas to poorer ones over the past century ðVan deWalle
2009Þ. It is thus not surprising to ﬁnd evidence of the relative persistence of
wealth in centralized areas from the precolonial period to the present.
As regards the literature on the contemporary legacies of precolonial cen-
tralization, our results support the ﬁnding that centralization is correlated with
contemporary development but do not support the idea that the mechanism is
through the quality of local government in centralized areas. In suggesting the
persistence of poverty from the precolonial period to the present, we thereby
argue against the noted Reversal of Fortune thesis proposed by Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson ð2002Þ, whereby colonialism made poorer areas rich
and turned richer areas poor. Our results instead match with those of Ban-
dyopadhyay and Green ð2012Þ, who argue that this reversal did not take place
within Africa, alongside those of Hjort ð2010Þ and others who suggest that
precolonial social formations have persistent effects on contemporary devel-
opment.
Moreover, our results add to a growing literature on the speciﬁc impact of
precolonial political centralization on subsequent economic and political de-
velopment. For instance, Gerring et al. ð2011Þ show that precolonial centrali-
zation is positively and robustly correlated with indirect colonial rule, which
suggests that much of the impact of colonialism on contemporary development
may in fact be attributable to the inﬂuence of precolonial development instead.
Similarly, Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman ð2002Þ suggest that a history of
a state over the past 2,000 years is highly correlated at the cross-national level
with contemporary measures of political stability and economic development.
We hope this analysis has contributed toward the growing literature on the
role of history in contemporary African development. Further work on this
subject could investigate the same relationships in another context, whether in
another African country or somewhere else with similarly large variation in
levels of precolonial centralization.
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Appendix A
TABLE A1
ETHNIC GROUPS AND PRECOLONIAL CENTRALIZATION
Ethnic Group Centralization Similar Ethnic Group
Acholi 1
Alur 1
Aringa 1 Acholi/Iteso/Kakwa
Baamba 0
Babukusu 1
Tiriki ðLuhya;
in KenyaÞ
Babwisi 0 Baamba
Bafumbira 3 Banyarwanda
Baganda 3
Bagisu 1
Bagungu 3 Banyoro/Batoro
Bagwe 1
Tiriki ðLuhya;
in KenyaÞ
Bagwere 2 Basoga
Bahehe 2
Bahororo 3 Banyankole
Bakenyi 2 Basoga
Bakhonzo 0
Bakiga 0
Banyankole 3
Banyara 3 Baganda/Banyoro
Banyarwanda 3
Banyole 1
Tiriki ðLuhya;
in KenyaÞ
Banyoro 3
Baruli 3 Baganda/Banyoro
Basamia 1
Tiriki ðLuhya;
in KenyaÞ
Basoga 2
Basongora 0 Baamba
Batagwenda 3 Banyankole/Batoro
Ethnic Group Centralization Similar Ethnic Group
Batoro 3
Batuku 3 Batoro
Batwa 0 Mbuti ðin the DRCÞ
Chope 1 Acholi/Iteso/Kakwa
Dodoth 1 Jie
Ethur 1 Jie
Ik ðTeusoÞ 1 Acholi/Iteso/Kakwa
Iteso 1
Jie 1
Jopadhola 1 Acholi/Iteso/Kakwa
Kumam 1 Acholi/Iteso/Kakwa
Jonam 1 Acholi/Iteso/Kakwa
Kakwa 1
Karimojong 1 Jie
KebuðokebuÞ 1 Acholi/Iteso/Kakwa
Kuku 1
Kumam 1 Acholi/Iteso/Kakwa
Langi 1
Lendu 1 Acholi/Iteso/Kakwa
Lugbara 1
Madi 1
Mening 1 Iteso
Mvuba 1 Acholi/Iteso/Kakwa
Napore 1 Acholi/Iteso/Kakwa
Nubi 1
Dinka ðin SudanÞ/
Kakwa/Lugbara
Nyangia 1 Acholi/Iteso/Kakwa
Pokot 1 Acholi/Iteso/Kakwa
Sabiny/Sebei 1
So/Tepeth/
Topotha 1
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Appendix B
TABLE B1
DATA SOURCES
Description Source
Dependent variable:
Access to safe drinking
water
Access to safe drinking water in 2008 Government of Uganda ð2008Þ
BCG immunization Average coverage of BCG ðtuberculosisÞ
immunization between 2007 and 2009
Government of Uganda ð2010Þ
DPT immunization Average coverage of DPT ðdiphtheria,
pertussis, and tetanusÞ immunization
between 2007 and 2009
Government of Uganda ð2010Þ
GDPIndex GDP per capita index for 2005 UNDP ð2007Þ
HDI2003 Human development index for 2003 UNDP ð2005Þ
HDI2005 Human development index for 2005 UNDP ð2007Þ
Gross enrollment index Index of the ratio of all pupils enrolled in
primary school to the total population
of 6–12-year-olds in the district for 2005
UNDP ð2007Þ
Gross enrollment ratio Average ratio of all pupils enrolled in
primary school to the total population
of 6–12-year-olds in the district between
2007 and 2009
Government of Uganda ð2010Þ
Gross intake ratio Average ratio of all pupils enrolled in
primary grade 1 to the total population
of 6-year-olds per district between 2007
and 2009
Government of Uganda ð2010Þ
Health centers per
10,000 inhabitants
Total number of health centers per 10,000
inhabitants
Government of Uganda ð2010Þ
Inequality Gini index of inequality, ranging from 0
ðperfect equalityÞ to 1 ðperfect inequalityÞ
Emwanu et al. ð2007Þ
Life expectancy index Average life expectancy index for 2005 UNDP ð2007Þ
Literacy index Adult literacy index for 2005 UNDP ð2007Þ
Measles immunization Average coverage ofmeasles immunization
between 2007 and 2009
Government of Uganda ð2010Þ
Net enrollment ratio Average ratio of pupils enrolled in primary
school age 6–12 to the total population
of 6–12-year-olds in the district between
2007 and 2009
Government of Uganda ð2010Þ
Net intake ratio Average ratio of pupils age 6 enrolled in
primary grade 1 to the total population
of 6-year-olds per district between 2007
and 2009
Government of Uganda ð2010Þ
Oral polio vaccine Average coverage of oral polio vaccine
between 2007 and 2009
Government of Uganda ð2010Þ
Percentage of district
health posts filled
Percentage of district health posts filled
ðactual number divided by the normÞ
in 2009
Government of Uganda ð2009Þ
Poverty gap Average gap in expenditure necessary for
the poor to reach the poverty line
Emwanu et al. ð2007Þ
Poverty headcount Percentage of residents under the poverty
line
Emwanu et al. ð2007Þ
Bandyopadhyay and Green 503
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.071 on May 12, 2016 01:33:23 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
TABLE B1 (Continued)
Description Source
Independent variable:
Border Dummy variable that takes the value 1 in
districts/subcounties that have an
international border and 0 otherwise
Computed by authors
Ecological diversity Level of ecological or vegetative diversity
in a given area
Fenske ð2014Þ
Ethnolinguistic
fractionalization ðELFÞ
Probability that two people chosen at
random will be from different ethnic
groups, as computed using the
Herfindahl index
Government of Uganda ð2002Þ
Precolonial centralization
dummy
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the
survey respondent is a member of an
ethnic group classified as having a degree
of precolonial political centralization at a
level 2 or higher ðwith a total of range
of 0–4Þ
Murdock ð1967Þ
Precolonial centralization
percentage
Percentage of people in each local
government unit who are members of
an ethnic group classified as having a
degree of precolonial political complexity
at a level 2 or higher ðwith a total of range
of 0–4Þ
Murdock ð1967Þ, Government
of Uganda ð2002Þ
Elevation Elevation in feet ðloggedÞ for each district
capital
Google Earth
Malaria Malaria ecology index Kiszewski et al. ð2004Þ
Rainfall Annual rainfall, with measurements ranging
across seven discrete values, from less
than 800 mm per annum ð0Þ to more
than 1,800 mm ð6Þ
Basalirwa ð1995Þ
Rivers/lakes Dummy variable that takes the value 1
in districts/subcounties that contain a
major river or lake
Computed by authors
Soil type:
Lithosol Dummy variable that takes the value 1
when a significant portion of the
district’s soil is lithosol and 0 otherwise
Government of Uganda ð1967Þ
Vitrosol Dummy variable that takes the value 1
when a significant portion of the
district’s soil is vitrosol and 0 otherwise
Government of Uganda ð1967Þ
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